We introduce RiffleScrambler: a new family of directed acyclic graphs and a corresponding data-independent memory hard function with password independent memory access. We prove its memory hardness in the random oracle model.
Introduction
In early days of computers' era passwords were stored in plaintext in the form of pairs (user, password). Back in 1960s it was observed, that it is not secure. It took around a decade to incorporate a more secure way of storing users' passwords -via a DES-based function crypt, as (user, f k (password)) for a secret key k or as (user, f (password)) for a one-way function. The first approach (with encrypting passwords) allowed admins to learn a user password while both methods enabled to find two users with the same password. To mitigate that problem, a random salt was added and in most systems, passwords are stored as (user, f (password, salt), salt) for a one-way function f . This way, two identical passwords will with high probability be stored as two different strings (since the salt should be chosen uniformly at random).
Then another issue appeared: an adversary, having a database of hashed passwords, can try many dictionary-based passwords or a more targeted attack [WZW + 16]. The ideal password should be random, but users tend to select passwords with low entropy instead. Recently, a probabilistic model of the distribution of choosing passwords, based on Zipf's law was proposed [WCW + 17] . That is why one requires password-storing function to be "slow" enough to compute for an attacker and "fast" enough to compute for the authenticating server.
To slow-down external attackers two additional enhancements were proposed. Pepper is similar to salt, its value is sampled from uniform distribution and passwords are stored as (user, f (password, salt, pepper), salt) but the value of pepper is not stored -evaluation (and guessing) of a password is slowed down by the factor equal to the size of the space from which pepper is chosen. Garlic is also used to slow down the process of verifying a password -it tells how many times f is called, a password is stored as (user, f garlic (password, salt, pepper), salt, garlic). Using pepper and garlic has one bottleneck -it slows down at the same rate both an attack and the legitimate server. Moreover this approach does not guarantee required advantage over an adversary who can evaluate a function simultaneously using ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) or clusters of GPUs. The reason is that the cost of evaluation of hash functions like SHA-1, SHA-2 on an ASIC is even several thousands times smaller than on a CPU. For instance Antminer S9 has claimed performance of 14 TH/s [ant] (double SHA256) versus about 30 GH/s for the best currently available GPU cards (GeForce GTX 1080TI, Radeon RX Vega 56) and up to 1 GH/s for CPUs. Percival [Per] noted that memory cost is more comparable across various platforms than computation time. He suggested a memory-hard functions (MHF) and introduced scrypt [Per] . So the right approach in designing a password-storing function is not only to make a function slow, but to make it use relatively large amounts of memory.
One can think about an MHF as a procedure of evaluating a function F which uses some ordering of memory calls. Such a function can be described as a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) G = G F . Vertex v represents some internal value, and if evaluating this value requires values at v i1 , . . . , v iM , then v i1 , . . . , v iM are parents of v in G. For example, calculating a function Bur00] where N = 1024) can be represented by a graph G = (V, E) with vertices {v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v N −1 , v N } and edges E = {(v i , v i+1 ), i = 0, . . . , N − 1} (i.e., a path). Initially, the value at vertex v 0 is x, computations yield in value F (x) at vertex v N .
We can categorize MHFs into two groups: data dependent MHFs (dMHF) and data independent MHFs (iMHF). Roughly speaking, for iMHFs the order of computations (graph G F ) does not depend on a password (but it can still depend on a salt), whereas the ordering of calculations in dMHFs depends on data (i.e., a password). Because dMHFs may be susceptible to various side-channel attacks (via e.g., timing attacks, memory access pattern) the main focus is on designing iMHFs.
Sequential vs Parallel attacks. Security of memory-hard functions can be analyzed in two models: sequential one and parallel one. In the sequential model, an adversary tries to invert a function by performing computation on a single-core machine while in the parallel model an adversary may use many processors to achieve its goal. The security of a given memory-hard function comes from the properties of the underlying graphs, e.g., if an underlying graph is a Superconcentrator (see Definition 3) then a function is memory-hard in the sequential model while if the underlying graph is depth-robust then the function is memory-hard in the parallel model.
Related Work
To compare various constructions, besides iMHF and dMHF distinction, one considers the complexity of evaluation of a given function. The formal definitions of sequential/parallel complexity are stated in Section 2 (and are formalized as a pebble-game), here we provide the intuitive motivation behind these definitions. The sequential complexity Π st (G) of a directed acyclic graph G is the time it takes to label (pebble/evaluate) the graph times the maximal number of memory cells the best sequential algorithm needs to evaluate (pebble) the graph. In the similar fashion one defines cumulative complexity of parallel pebbling Π || cc (G) of G, here this is the sum of the number of used memory cells during labeling (pebbling) the graph by the best parallel algorithm. For detailed discussion on the pebbling game see e.g. [AS15, BCGS16, FLW, LT82] .
For a graph that corresponds to evaluating PBKDF2 above values are equal to Π st (P BKDF 2) = n and Π || cc (P BKDF 2) = n while if a function is memory hard Π st (P BKDF 2) = Ω(n 2 ). The Password Hashing Competition [phc] •
• If τ, σ ∈ N + such that n = σ · τ then with high probability
Alwen and Blocki [AB16] show that it is possible (in parallel setting) that an attacker may save space for any iMHF (e.g., Argon2i, Balloon, Catena, etc.) so the Π || cc is not Ω(n 2 ) but Ω(n 2 /log n). The attack is applicable only when the instance of an MHF requires large amount of memory (e.g., > 1GB) while in practice, MHFs would be run so the memory consumption is of the order of just several megabytes (e.g., 16MB). In order to mount such an attack, a special-purpose hardware must be built (with lots of shared memory and many cores). While Alwen, Blocki and Pietrzak [ABP17] improve these attacks even further, it was still unclear if this type of attack is of practical concern. But recently Alwen and Blocki [AB17] improved these attacks even more and presented implementation which e.g., successfully ran against the latest version of Argon (Argon2i-B).
Our contribution
In this paper (details given in Section 3) we introduce RiffleScrambler -a new family of directed acyclic graphs and a corresponding data-independent memory hard function with password independent memory access. We prove its memory hardness in the random oracle model. For a password x, a salt s and security parameters (integers) g, λ:
1. a permutation ρ = ρ g (s) of N = 2 g elements is generated using (time reversal of) Riffle Shuffle (see Algorithm 1) and 5 2. a computation graph RSG
Evaluation of RiffleScrambler (a function on 2λ stacked RSG N graphs) with S = N = 2 g memory cells takes the number of steps proportional to T ≈ 3λN (the max-indegree of the graph is equal to 3). Our result on time-memory trade-off concerning sequential attacks is following. λ (the punishment for decreasing available memory cells is severe). The result for sequential model gives the same level as for Catena (see Lemma 1) while it is much better than for BallonHashing (see Lemma 2). The main advantage of RiffleScrambler (compared to Catena) is that each salt corresponds (with high probability) to a different computation graph, and there are N ! = 2 g ! of them (while Catena uses one, e.g., bit-reversal based graph). Moreover it is easy to modify RiffleScrambler so the number of possible computation graphs is equal to
(we can use different -also salt dependent -permutations in each stack).
On the other hand RiffleScrambler guarantees better immunity against parallel attacks than Catena's computation graph. Our result concerning parallel attacks is following.
Lemma 4. For positive integers λ, g let n = 2 g (2λg + 1) for some g ∈ N + . Then
The RiffleScrambler is a password storing method that is immune to cachetiming attacks since memory access pattern is password-independent.
Preliminaries
For a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V, E) of n = |V | nodes, we say that the indegree is δ = max v∈V indeg(v) if δ is the smallest number such that for any v ∈ V the number of incoming edges is not larger than δ. Parents of a node v ∈ V is the set parents G (v) = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}.
We say that u ∈ V is a source node if it has no parents (has indegree 0) and we say that u ∈ V is a sink node if it is not a parent for any other node (it has 0 outdegree). We denote the set of all sinks of G by sinks(G) = {v ∈ V : outdegree(v) = 0}.
we denote it by length(p) = t. The depth d = depth(G) of a graph G is the length of the longest directed path in G.
Pebbling and complexity
One of the methods for analyzing iMHFs is to use so called pebbling game. We will follow [ABP17] with the notation (see also therein for more references on pebbling games).
Definition 1 (Parallel/Sequential Graph Pebbling). Let G = (V, E) be a DAG and let T ⊂ V be a target set of nodes to be pebbled. A pebbling configuration (of G) is a subset P i ⊂ V . A legal parallel pebbling of T is a sequence P = (P 0 , . . . , P t ) of pebbling configurations of G, where P 0 = ∅ and which satisfies conditions 1 and 2 below. A sequential pebbling additionally must satisfy condition 3.
1. At some step every target node is pebbled (though not necessarily simultaneously).
2. Pebbles are added only when their predecessors already have a pebble at the end of the previous step.
3. At most one pebble is placed per step.
We denote with P G,T and P || G,T the set of all legal sequential and parallel pebblings of G with target set T , respectively.
Note that P G,T ⊂ P || G,T . The most interesting case is when T = sinks(G), with such a T we write P G and P || G . Definition 2 (Time/Space/Cumulative Pebbling Complexity). The time, space, space-time and cumulative complexity of a pebbling P = {P 0 , . . . , P t } ∈ P || G are defined as:
For α ∈ {s, t, st, cc} and a target set T ⊂ V , the sequential and parallel pebbling complexities of G are defined as
When T = sinks(G) we write Π α (G) and Π || α (G).
Tools for sequential attacks
Definition 3 (N -Superconcentrator). A directed acyclic graph G = V, E with a set of vertices V and a set of edges E, a bounded indegree, N inputs, and N outputs is called N-Superconcentrator if for every k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ N and for every pair of subsets V 1 ⊂ V of k inputs and V 2 ⊂ V of k outputs, there are k vertex-disjoint paths connecting the vertices in V 1 to the vertices in V 2 .
By stacking λ (an integer) N -Superconcentrators we obtain a graph called
Let G be the graph created by joining the outputs of G i to the corresponding inputs of
Pebbling a (N, λ)-Superconcentrator using S ≤ N/20 pebbles requires T placements such that
Tools for parallel attacks
We build upon the results from [ABP17], hence we shall recall the definitions used therein.
For (e, d)-depth-robust graph we have
We can obtain better bounds on Π || cc (G) having more assumptions on the structure of G.
We say that L has a (z, g)−dependency if there exist nodes-disjoint paths p 1 , . . . , p z of length at least g each ending in L.
Definition 7 (Dispersed Graph [ABP17] ). Let g ≥ k be positive integers. A DAG G is called (g, k)−dispersed if there exists ordering of its nodes such that the following holds. Let [k] denote last k nodes in the ordering of G and let 
For stacked dispersed graphs we have
Riffle Scrambler
The RiffleScrambler function uses the following parameters:
• s is a salt which is used to generate a graph G,
• λ -is the number of layers of the graph G.
Let HW (x) denote the Hamming weight of a binary string x (i.e., the number of ones in x), andx denotes a coordinate-wise complement of x (thus HW (x) denotes number of zeros in x).
n (a binary word of length n). We define a rank r B (i) of a bit i in B as
Definition 10 (Riffle-Permutation). Let B = (b 0 . . . b n−1 ) be a binary word of length n. A permutation π induced by B is defined as Algorithm 3 is responsible for generating an N -Double-Riffle-Graph which is defined in the following way. From now on, we assume that N = 2 g .
Definition 12 (N -Double-Riffle-Graph). Let V denote the set of vertices and E be the set of edges of G = (V, E). Let B 0 , . . . , B g−1 be g binary words of the length 2 g each. Then N -Double-Riffle-Graph is obtained by stacking 2g SingleLayer-Riffle-Graphs resulting in a graph consisting of (2g + 1)2 g vertices
2 g −1 }, and edges:
• (2g + 1)2 g edges:
, . . . , 2 g − 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2 g },
and the following edges for the lower g layers -which are symmetric with respect to the level g (and where we use inverse of permutations induced by B j , j ∈ {0, . . . , g − 1}):
for i ∈ {0, . . . , 2 g − 1}, j ∈ {1, . . . , g}.
Definition 13 ((N, λ)-Double-Riffle-Graph). Let G i , i = 0, . . . , λ − 1 be NDouble-Riffle-Graphs. The (N, λ)-Double-Riffle-Graph is a graph obtained by stacking λ times N -Double-Riffle-Graphs together by joining outputs of G i to the corresponding inputs of G i+1 , i = 0, . . . , λ − 2.
One of the ingredients of our main procedure is a construction of (N, λ)-Double-Riffle-Graph using specific binary words B 0 , . . . , B g−1 . To continue, we have to introduce "trajectory tracing". For given σ -a permutation of {0, . . . , 2 g − 1} -let B be a binary matrix of size 2 g × g, whose j-th row is a binary representation of σ(j), j = 0, . . . , 2 g − 1. Denote by B i the i-th column of B, i.e., B = (B 0 , . . . , B 2 g −1 ). We call this matrix a binary representation of σ. Then we create a binary matrix B = (B 0 , . . . , B 2 g −1 ) (also of size 2 g × g) in the following way. We set B 0 = B 0 . For i = 1, . . . , 2 g −1 we set B i = π B T i−1 (B i ). The procedure TraceTrajectories is given in Algorithm 2.
Roughly speaking, the procedure RiffleScrambler(x, s, g, λ) works in the following way.
• For given salt s it calculates a pseudorandom permutation σ (using inverse Riffle Shuffle), let B be its binary representation.
• It calculates B =TraceTrajectories(B).
• It creates an instance of N -Double-Riffle-Graph (2g +1 rows of 2 g vertices) using B • Last row is rewritten to first one, i.e., v
and whole evaluation is repeated λ times.
• Finally, the value at v 2g 2 g −1 is returned.
The main procedure RiffleScrambler(x, s, g, λ) for storing a password x using salt s and memory-hardness parameters g, λ is given in Algorithm 4. We obtain trajectories of the elements and we can derive words/permutations for each layer of the graph:
• B 0 = B 0 = (11100100) T (used in the previous examples) -obtained by concatenating first digits of elements, we have π B0 = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 4 5 6 0 1 7 2 3 .
•
(11100100) = (11000011) T , thus π B1 = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 4 5 0 1 2 3 6 7 .
T , thus π B2 = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 4 5 1 6 2 3 7 .
• The resulting graph is given in Fig. 3 . for i = 0 to 2 g − 1 do
11:
end for 13: end for 14: return π Algorithm 4 RiffleScrambler(n, x, s, g, λ)
Require: s {Salt}, g {Garlic}, x {Value to Hash}, λ {Depth}, H {Hash Function} Ensure: 
Proofs

Proof of Lemma 3
In this Section we present the security proof of our scheme in the sequential model of adversary. Recall that N = 2 g . To prove Lemma 3 it is enough to prove the following theorem (since then the assertion follows from Theorem 2).
Theorem 5. Let ρ = (ρ 0 , . . . , ρ 2 g −1 ) be a permutation of N = 2 g elements, let B be its binary representation and let B = (B 0 , . . . , B g−1 ) =TraceTrajectories(B). Let G be an N -Double-Riffle-Graph using B. Then G is an N -Superconcentrator.
Before we proceed to the main part of the proof, we shall introduce some auxiliary lemmas showing some useful properties of the N -Double-Riffle-Graph.
Lemma 5. Let ρ be a permutation of N = 2 g elements, ρ = (ρ 0 , . . . , ρ 2 g −1 ) and let B be its binary representation. Let B =TraceTrajectories(B). LetḠ be the subgraph of N -Double-Riffle-Graph G constructed using B, consisting of g + 1 layers and only of directed edges corresponding to the trajectories defined by ρ. 
The above lemma is very closely related to the interpretation of time-reversed Riffle Shuffle process and it follows from a simple inductive argument. Let us focus on the last layer ofḠ, i.e., the sets of vertices V g−1 = {v In order to provide a pebbling-based argument on memory hardness of the RiffleScrambler, we need the result on the structure of N -Double-Riffle-Graph given by the following Lemma 6, which is somewhat similar to that of Lemma 4 from [Bra17] . . Clearly, P v = P * v and P w = P * w . Moreover, one can easily see that P v and P * v move v 0 to v g , P w and P * w move w 0 to w g . Since other trajectories are not affected when replacing P u with P * u for u ∈ {v, w}, such replacement does not change the order of vertices in g th row. If P v and P w differ only on positions j and k, then P v = P * w and P w = P * v , what leads to two different sets of trajectories resulting in the same correspondence between vertices from rows 0 and g. This contradicts Corollary 1. Otherwise, there exist another two trajectories P x = P * v and P y = P * w . However, in such situation, from Lemma 5 it follows that x 0 and v 0 should be moved to the same vertex x g = v g , but this is not the case (similar holds for y and w). Thus, the resulting contradiction finishes the proof.
Being equipped with the lemmas introduced above, we can now proceed with the proof of Theorem 5.
of Theorem 5. We need to show that for every k : 1 ≤ k ≤ G and for every pair of subsets V in ⊆ {v The reasoning proceeds in a similar vein to the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 from [Bra17] . Below we present an outline of the main idea of the proof.
Let us notice that it is enough to show that for any V in of size k there exists k vertex-disjoint paths that connect vertices of V in to the vertices of V middle ⊆ {v g 0 , . . . , v g 2 g −1 } with vertices of V middle forming a line, i.e., either:
unknown Salt-dependent graph yes yes yes no yes Figure 4 : Comparison of the efficiency and security of BalloonHashing (BHG 3 is BalloonHashing with δ = 3 and BHG 7 is BHG graph for δ = 7), Argon2i, Catena (with Butterfly graph) and RiffleScrambler (RSG).
If the above is shown, we obtain the claim by finding vertex-disjoint paths between V in and V middle and then from V middle to V out from the symmetry of G-Double-Riffle-Graph. Fix 1 ≤ k ≤ G and let V in and V out be some given size-k subsets of input and output vertices, respectively, as defined above. From Lemma 6 it follows that if some two vertices x and y are connected in i th round forming a size-1 switch then they will never be connected again until round g. Thus, the paths from x and y can move according to different bits in that round, hence being distinguished (they will share no common vertex). Having this in mind, we can construct the nodes-disjoint paths from V in to V middle in the following way. Starting in vertices from V in , the paths will move through the first t = ⌈log k⌉ rounds according to all distinct t-bits trajectories. Then, after round t, we will choose some fixed g − t-sequence τ common for all k paths and let them follow according τ . Lemma 5 implies that the k paths resulting from the construction described above after g steps will eventually end up in some subset V middle of k vertices forming a line, whereas Lemma 6 ensures that the paths are vertexdisjoint.
Summary
We presented a new memory hard function which can be used as a secure password-storing scheme. RiffleScrambler achieves better time-memory tradeoffs than Argon2i and Balloon Hashing when the buffer size n grows and the number of rounds r is fixed (and the same as Catena-DBG).
On the other hand, in the case of massively-parallel adversaries the situation of Catena is much worse than RiffleScrambler. In Catena, only double-butterfly graph (Catena-DBG) offered a time-memory trade-off which depends on the number of layers of the graph. Unfortunately, Catena-DBG is just a single graph instance, so in theory an adversary may try to build a parallel hardware to achieve better trade-off. In the case of RiffleScrambler the time-memory tradeoff is the same as for the Catena-DBG but for RiffleScrambler, a different salt corresponds (with high probability) to the computation on a different (one from N !) graph. So an adversary cannot build just a single device for cracking all passwords (as in the case of Catena).
A Markov chains, mixing times, strong stationary times
Consider an ergodic Markov chain X = {X k , k ≥ 0} on a finite state space E with stationary distribution π. Ergodicity implies that d T V (L(X k ), π) → 0 (total variation distance) as k → ∞, where L(X k ) is the distribution of the chain at step k. Define τ mix (ε) = inf{k : d T V (L(X k ), π) ≤ ε}, often called total variation mixing time.
Perfect simulation and strong stationary times. Perfect simulation refers to the art of converting an algorithm for running a Markov chain into an algorithm which returns an unbiased sample from its stationary distribution. Coupling from the past (CFTP) is one of the most known ones. However, it is not applicable to our models. Another method is based on strong stationary times (SSTs), a method whose prime application is studying the rate of convergence (of a chain to its stationary distribution).
Definition 14. A stopping time is a random variable T ∈ N such that the event {T = k} depends only on X 0 , . . . , X k . A stopping time T is a strong stationary time (SST) if
Due to [AD87] ,we have
Remark 1. An SST T can be non-randomized, i.e., an event {T = k} depends only on on the path X 0 , . . . , X k and does not use any extra randomness (which is the case for randomized SST). For non-randomized SST performing perfect simulation is relatively easy: simply run the chain X k until event T occurs and stop. Then X T has distribution π.
Obtaining a random permutation: SST for Riffle Shuffle. In our applications we will need a random permutation of N elements. We can think of these elements as of cards, and of a chain on permutations as of card shuffling. Consider the following shuffling scheme (one step of a corresponding Markov chain):
For each card in the deck, flip a coin and label the back of the card with 0 (if Heads occurred) or with 1 (if Tails occurred). Take all the cards labeled 1 out of the deck and put them on the top keeping their relative ordering.
This is the inverse Riffle Shuffle. The following rule is an SST for this shuffling (due to Aldous and Diaconis [AD86] ):
Keep track of assigned bits (storing a sequence of assigned bits for each card). Stop when all the sequences are different.
Once stopped, we have a permutation obtained from exactly uniform distribution (which is the stationary distribution of this chain). On average, this takes 2 log 2 N steps. What we considered was an idealized model, in a sense that if we use some shuffling scheme in cryptography, we do not have an infinite sequence of random numbers. In reality we must obtain them in a deterministic way, e.g., from a private key or a salt (depending on applications). In our constructions, it depends on some salt s and some hash function H. The Algorithm 1 called RiffleShuffle H (n, s) takes as input a salt s, a hash function H and the number of elements n. It performs inverse Riffle Shuffle (with randomness obtained from salt s and hash function H) until above SST event occurs. Thus, its output is a random permutation of {1, . . . , n} (in the random-oracle model).
